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Abstract 
Muslims have been living in South Africa for over 300 years. These persons are required in terms of their religion to fol-
low Islamic law. There has (to date) been no legislation enacted by the South African parliament that gives effect to Islamic 
law. South African Muslims are able to make use of existing South African law provisions in order to apply certain Islam-
ic laws within the South African context. An example of this would be where a testator or testatrix makes use of the South 
African common law right to freedom of testation in order to ensure that his or her estate is distributed in terms of the 
Islamic law of succession upon his or her demise (Islamic will). This would ensure that his or her beneficiaries would 
inherit from his or her estate in terms of the Islamic law of succession. A potential problem could arise in the event where a 
beneficiary who inherits in terms of an Islamic will, renounces a benefit. Should the Islamic law or South African law 
consequences of renunciation apply? This paper critically analyses a recent South African High Court judgment where 
the issue of renunciation of a benefit in terms of an Islamic will was looked at. 
 
*  Muneer Abduroaf is a law lecturer at the University of the Western Cape. He completed an LLB Islamic Law Degree at 
the Islamic University of Madeenah in Saudi Arabia. He also completed an LLB Law Degree, an LLM Law Degree, and 
an LLD Law Degree at the University of the Western Cape in South Africa. 
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I. Introduction 
Muslims have been living in South Africa for over 300 years.1 These persons are required in 
terms of their religion to follow Islamic law. There has (to date) been no legislation enacted by 
the South African parliament that gives effect to Islamic law. South African Muslims are able to 
make use of existing South African law provisions in order to apply certain Islamic laws within 
the South African context. An example of this would be where a testator or testatrix makes use 
of the common law right to freedom of testation in order to ensure that his or her estate is dis-
tributed in terms of the Islamic law of succession upon his or her demise.2 This would ensure 
that his or her beneficiaries would inherit from his or her estate in terms of the Islamic law of 
succession. A potential problem could arise in the event where a beneficiary who inherits in 
terms of the above-mentioned will renounces a benefit. An example of this would be where a 
child of a testator renounces his or her benefits in terms of his last will and testament. The 
Western Cape Division of the High Court held that such benefits must be inherited by the sur-
viving spouse or spouses in terms of s 2(C)(1) of the Wills Act 7 of 1953 (hereafter referred to as 
the Wills Act).3 The High Court judgment was subsequently confirmed by the Constitutional 
Court on the 29 June 2018.4 This paper aims to highlight some of the problems created as a re-
sult of the Constitutional Court judgment. It discusses the application of the Islamic law of 
succession within the South African context by way of introduction. It then analyses the Moosa 
NO and Others v Harnaker and Others judgment and concludes with recommendations as to a 
way forward.5 
II. Application of the Islamic Law of Succession in South 
Africa 
A South African Muslim is able to make use of the right to freedom of testation in order to ap-
ply the Islamic law of succession to his or her estate upon his or her demise. A basic clause in a 
will stating that the Islamic law of succession must be applied to his or her estate would suffice 
in this regard. This type of a will could be referred to as an Islamic will.6 The clause would 
direct that an Islamic institution or an Islamic law expert should draft an Islamic distribution 
certificate which states who the lawful beneficiaries of the testator or testatrix are at the time of 
his or her demise. Islamic wills are generally accepted by the Master of the High Court for liq-
uidation and distribution purposes.7 It could be argued that this constitutes delegation of tes-
 
1 The first recorded Muslim arrived in South Africa in 1654. See MAHIDA EBRAHIM MOHAMED, History of Muslims in 
South Africa: A Chronology, Durban 1993, at 1. 
2 South African law recognises the common law principle of freedom of testation. See JAMNECK JUANITA, Freedom of 
testation, in: Jamneck Juanita, et al., The Law of Succession in South Africa, Cape Town 2009, at 115, for a discussion on 
this issue. 
3 Moosa NO and Others v Harnaker and Others 2017 (6) SA 425 (WCC), at para 39. 
4 Moosa NO and Others v Harnaker and Others (CCT) 251/17. 
5 Moosa v Harnaker (WCC), supra n. 3; and Moosa v Harnaker (CCT), supra n. 4. 
6 ABDUROAF KHALID, Deceased Estates: Islamic Law Mode of Distribution, Highlands Estate 2017, at 210-215; and ABDU-
ROAF MUNEER, The Impact of South African Law on the Islamic Law of Succession, Bellville 2018, at 205-207, for exam-
ples of Islamic wills. 
7 In the Moosa v Harnaker judgment it was stated that “[t]he deceased in his Last Will and Testament (‘the Will’) dated 23 
January 2011, expressly referred to his marriages to both women. In terms of the Will the deceased directed that his es-
tate should devolve in terms of Islamic Law and that a certificate from the Muslim Judicial Council or any other recog-
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tamentary powers, which is prohibited in terms of South African law.8 It has been argued that 
the application of the Islamic wills has been incorporated into South African law by way of 
custom.9 A further discussion on this issue is beyond the scope of this paper. 
III. An Analysis of the Moosa NO and Others v Harnaker 
and Others Judgment 
The facts of this case concerned a deceased Muslim (X) male who died testate on 9 June 2014. X 
was married to two wives when he died.10 He married his first wife (Y) in terms of Islamic law 
on 10 March 1957. He subsequently married his second wife (Z) in terms of Islamic law on 31 
May 1964. Y consented to the marriage between X and Z.11 X subsequently married Y in terms 
of South African law during August 1982. Z consented to the civil marriage between X and Y.12 
A total of nine children were born of the two marriages. Four of these children were male and 
five were female. X’s will was executed on 23 January 2011 and it stated that his estate must 
devolve in terms of Islamic law. It further stated that an Islamic distribution certificate issued 
by the Muslim Judicial Council (SA) or other judicial body shall be final and binding upon the 
executors of his will.13 The Islamic distribution certificate was issued by the Muslim Judicial 
Council (SA) in terms of Al Quraan, sura 4 (11-12).14 The Islamic distribution certificate stated 
                                                                                                                                                                         
nised Muslim Judicial Authority shall be final and binding on his executors.”, see Moosa v Harnaker (WCC), supra n. 3, at 
para 5. 
8 An example of an invalid delegation of testamentary power would be in a situation where the grantee thereof is given 
unlimited discretion. This could be referred to as a general power of appointment. An example of general power of ap-
pointment would be where X states in his will that the beneficiaries of his estate shall be decided by his daughter Y, see 
DE WAAL M. J./SCHOEMAN-MALAN M.C., Law of Succession, 5th ed., Cape Town 2015, at 49.  
9 See ABDUROAF MUNEER, supra n. 6, at 125, where it was argued that the common law has been developed through cus-
tom and is now part of South African law. It should also be noted that the Islamic law expert who drafts the Islamic Dis-
tribution Certificate does not have unlimited power. He can only issue a certificate in terms of Islamic law. 
10 Moosa v Harnaker (WCC) supra n. 3, at para 4. 
11 M is married to X in terms of both Islamic law and the Marriage Act 25 of 1961. See Moosa v Harnaker (WCC), supra n. 3, 
at para 3. 
12 Moosa v Harnaker (WCC), supra n. 3, at paras 3-7. 
13 Moosa v Harnaker (WCC), supra n. 3, at paras 4-8. It should be noted that a clause in an Islamic will stating that Islamic 
law should apply could be problematic in the event where there are differences of opinions found within Islamic law. I 
am of the opinion that a testator or testatrix must state in his or her will which school of law must find application in this 
regard. This would also bring about legal certainty and prevent abuse by executors of estates who are trusted with ad-
ministering Islamic wills. 
14 See KHAN MUHAMMAD MUHSIN, The Noble Qur’an - English Translation of the Meanings and Commentary, New Delhi 
1404H, sura 4 (11-12), where it states: “11. Allah commands you as regards your children’s (inheritance); to the male, a 
portion equal to that of two females; if (there are) only daughters, two or more, their share is two thirds of the inher-
itance; if only one, her share is half. For parents, a sixth share of inheritance to each if the deceased left children; if no 
children, and the parents are the (only) heirs, the mother has a third; if the deceased left brothers or (sisters), the mother 
has a sixth. (The distribution in all cases is) after the payment of legacies he may have bequeathed or debts. You know 
not which of them, whether your parents or your children, are nearest to you in benefit, (these fixed shares) are ordained 
by Allah. And Allah is Ever All-Knower, All-Wise. 12. In that which your wives leave, your share is a half if they have no 
child; but if they leave a child, you get a fourth of that which they leave after payment of legacies that they may have be-
queathed or debts. In that which you leave, their (your wives) share is a fourth if you leave no child; but if you leave a 
child, they get an eighth of that which you leave after payment of legacies that you may have bequeathed or debts. If the 
man or woman whose inheritance is in question has left neither ascendants nor descendants, but has left a brother or a 
sister, each one of the two gets a sixth; but if more than two, they share in a third; after payment of legacies he (or she) 
may have bequeathed or debts, so that no loss is caused (to anyone). This is a Commandment from Allah; and Allah is 
Ever All-Knowing, Most-Forbearing.” These verses stipulate the inheritance of parents, children, surviving spouses, and 
uterine siblings. 
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that each widow must inherit 1/16 = 13/208, each son must inherit 7/52 = 28/208, and each 
daughter must inherit 7/104 = 14/208.15 
The nine children renounced the benefits due to them in terms of the Islamic distribution certif-
icate.16 The nine children “[…] all agreed and expressed their intention in writing to renounce 
all their benefits accruing to them in terms of the Will read with the Islamic distribution certifi-
cate and stipulated that it be inherited in equal shares by the Second and Third Applicants 
[surviving spouses of the testator]. As a result of the renunciation, the Executor relied upon the 
provisions of s 2(C)(1) of the Wills Act.” The executor considered both Y and Z to be surviving 
spouses for purposes of s 2(C)(1), and was of the opinion that the renounced benefits should 
vest in them equally.17 The liquidation and distribution account recorded that Y and Z would 
each inherit an equal share of the renounced benefits. The liquidation and distribution account 
was accepted by the Master of the High Court.18 The Registrar of Deeds was of the opinion that 
the benefits renounced by the descendants of X who were born from his marriage to Y should 
vest in Y as she was recognised as a surviving spouse for purposes of s 2(C)(1) due to her civil 
marriage with the deceased. The Registrar of Deeds was, however, of the opinion that the ben-
efits renounced by the descendants of X who were born from his marriage to Z should vest in 
the descendants of the children of the repudiating descendants in terms of s 2(C)(2) as the Is-
lamic marriage between X and Z was not recognised for purposes of s 2(C)(1).19  
The disputed matter was referred to the Western Cape Division of the High Court where it was 
argued that s 2(C)(1) unfairly discriminates against Z on the grounds of religion and marital 
status.20 The Court held that s 2(C)(1) is inconsistent with the Constitution as it does not in-
clude a husband or wife in a marriage that was solemnised in terms of Islamic law.21 Section 
2(C)(1) was declared invalid insofar as it does not include multiple widows married to a de-
ceased husband in terms of Islamic law.22 The order of invalidity was suspended subject to 
confirmation by the Constitutional Court as it required in terms of s 15(1) (a) of the Superior 
 
15 Moosa v Harnaker (WCC), supra n. 3, at para 7. The fact that the daughters inherited half the shares of the sons in terms of 
the Islamic Distribution Certificate raises the question of discrimination based on sex or gender. This issue is beyond the 
scope of this case note. It should be noted that the South African Constitution prohibits discrimination based on sex or 
gender. See s 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, where it states that “(3) [t]he state may not un-
fairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, 
marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, lan-
guage and birth. (4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds 
in terms of subsection (3).” 
16 The renouncement was reduced to writing. The children stated that they wanted the surviving spouses to inherit the 
renounced benefits in equal shares, see Moosa v Harnaker (WCC), supra n. 3, at para 8. 
17 Section 2(C)(1) of the Wills Act states that “[i]f any descendants of a testator, excluding a minor or a mentally ill de-
scendant, who, together with the surviving spouse of the testator, is entitled to a benefit in terms of a will renounces his 
right to receive such benefit, such benefit shall vest in the surviving spouse.” 
18 Moosa v Harnaker (WCC), supra n. 3, at para 9. 
19 Moosa v Harnaker (WCC), supra n. 3, at paras 12-13. It could be argued that the renounced benefits should technically vest 
in Y as she was the surviving spouse in terms of s 2(C)(1) It should be noted that s 2(C)(2) is also subject to s 2(C)(1). See s 
2(C)(2) of the Wills Act 7 of 1953 where it states that “[i]f a descendant of the testator, whether as a member of a class or 
otherwise, would have been entitled to a benefit in terms of the provisions of a will if he had been alive at the time of 
death of the testator, or had not been disqualified from inheriting, or had not after the testator’s death renounced his 
right to receive such a benefit, the descendants of that descendant shall, subject to the provisions of subsection (1), per 
stirpes be entitled to the benefit, unless the context of the will otherwise indicates.” 
20 Moosa v Harnaker (WCC), supra n. 3, at para 17. 
21 Moosa v Harnaker (WCC), supra n. 3, at para 39 (a) (i). 
22 Moosa v Harnaker (WCC), supra n. 3, at para 39 (a) (ii). 
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Courts Act 10 of 2013.23 The order of the High Court was in essence confirmed by the Constitu-
tional Court.24 
The question that should be raised is whether relying on s 2(C)(1) of the Wills Act was the cor-
rect approach or whether the Islamic distribution certificate should have been referred back to 
the Muslim Judicial Council (SA) for an amendment in terms of Islamic law based on the re-
nunciation.25 Two situations must be distinguished with regard to the above. The first situation 
would be where the last will and testament of the testator or testatrix expressly states how his 
or her estate should be distributed without any reference to Islamic law. In this instance 
s2(C)(1) of the Wills Act would find application. This would be the case even if the conse-
quences of the will are the same as Islamic law that would appear on the Islamic Distribution 
Certificate.26 The second situation would be where the testator or testatrix states in his or her 
last will and testament that his or her estate must be distributed in terms of Islamic law and 
that an Islamic law expert or Islamic institution should draft an Islamic Distribution Certificate 
in this regard. This is what has transpired in the Moosa v Harnaker case, and is the focal ques-
tion looked at in this paper.27 
I am of the opinion that s 2(C)(1) of the Wills Act should not find application in the above in-
stance. My argument is based on the fact that the testator stated in his last will and testament 
that his estate should be distributed in terms of Islamic law.28 This would be the application of 
the common law right to freedom of testation. I am of the opinion that the Muslim Judicial 
Council (SA) should have been approached in regards to the renunciation of benefits and the 
Islamic Distribution Certificate should have been amended accordingly. The Islamic law doc-
trine of takhaaruj would then have found application.29 The doctrine allows for renunciation of 
benefits in deceased estate. This could be done in favour of the surviving spouses. The doctrine 
of takhaaruj is broader than s 2(C)(1) as the children are not restricted in their renunciation in 
favour of the mother only. A child listed on the Islamic Distribution Certificate would, for ex-
ample, be free to renounce his or her benefit in favour of any of the other persons listed on the 
Islamic Distribution Certificate. The doctrine of takhaaruj also allows for renunciation in favour 
of an asset inside or outside of the deceased estate. An example of this would be where a son 
 
23 Moosa v Harnaker (WCC), supra n. 3, at para 39 (g). Section 15 (1) (a) of the Superior Courts Act states that “[w]henever 
the Supreme Court of Appeal, a Division of a High Court or any competent court declares an Act of Parliament, a pro-
vincial Act or conduct of the President invalid as contemplated in terms of s 172 (2) (a) of the Constitution, that court, 
must in accordance with the rules, refer the order of constitutional invalidity to the Constitutional Court for confirma-
tion.” 
24  See Moosa v Harnaker supra n. 4. 
25 Section 2(C)(1) of the Wills Act 7 of 1953 states that that “[i]f any descendants of a testator, excluding a minor or a men-
tally ill descendant, who, together with the surviving spouse of the testator, is entitled to a benefit in terms of a will re-
nounces his right to receive such benefit, such benefit shall vest in the surviving spouse.” 
26 Another question that should be looked at is whether the Islamic law consequences of renunciation should apply in the 
event where a testator or testatrix expressly states in his or her will that the Islamic law consequences should apply in 
the event where there is a renunciation by his or her child who he or she has bequeathed a testate benefit to. An example 
of this would be where a testator bequeaths 1/3 of his net estate in favour of his non-Muslim son. This son would not ap-
pear on the Islamic Distribution Certificate as is disqualified from inheriting in terms of the Islamic law of intestate suc-
cession. This question is beyond the scope of this paper as these are not the facts as found in the Moosa v Harnaker case. I 
am of the opinion that s 2(C)(1) would find application as the wording of the section does not allow for a difference con-
sequence to the renunciation. 
27 Moosa v Harnaker (WCC), supra n. 3, at para 7. 
28 Moosa v Harnaker (WCC), supra n. 3, at para 7. 
29  See AL SUBAA’EE MUSTAFAA, Sharḥ Al Qaanoon Al Aḥwaal Al Shakhshiyyah, vol. 2, part 3, 3rd ed., Beirut 2000, at 177-
178; and AL ZUḤAYLEE WAHBA, Al Fiqh Al Islaamee Wa Adillatuhoo, vol 8, 3rd ed., Damascus 1989, at 440-442. 
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renounces his right to inherit a share in estate in favour of the surviving spouse, in exchange 
for a car.30 It should be noted that there would be nothing preventing the son in this example 
from renouncing his share in the estate in favour of the surviving spouse for no exchange at all. 
The children in the Moosa v Harnaker case could therefore have renounced their rights in the 
estate in favour of the surviving spouses based on the doctrine. The Islamic Distribution Certif-
icate would then have reflected this. There would then have been no need for s 2(C) (1) of the 
Wills Act to apply.  
It could be argued that once an Islamic Distribution Certificate is issued and lodged with the 
Master of the High Court, s 2(C) (1) of the Wills Act should find application (as in the instance 
of Moosa v Harnaker), whereas the Islamic law consequences should apply in the event where 
the certificate has not yet been lodged. This type of a situation could lead to a friction between 
the rules applicable in terms of Islamic law and South African law. An example of this would 
be where a son of the testator wishes to renounce a benefit in favour of the testator’s father. 
This type of renunciation would be possible in terms of Islamic law in terms of the doctrine of 
takhaaruj, but it would not be possible in terms of s 2(C) (1) of the Wills Act. The renounced 
benefit should go to the surviving spouse in terms of s 2(C) (1) of the Wills Act, whereas it 
should go to the father in terms of the doctrine of takhaaruj. This situation could also lead to an 
abuse of power. If, for example, the testator of a deceased estate is aware that the son of the 
testator wants to renounce a benefit, he or she could then request the Islamic Distribution Cer-
tificate and lodge it prior to the renunciation. This would then ensure that the renounced bene-
fit would be inherited by the surviving spouse in terms of s 2(C)(1) of the Wills Act. He or she 
could, for example, also accept the renunciation document of a son in favour of the daughter of 
the deceased, but not inform the Islamic law expert of the renunciation. He would then subse-
quently lodge the renouncement document at the Masters Office. This would mean that the 
renouncement would now be in terms of s 2(C)(1) of the Wills Act and not in terms of Islamic 
law. This creates a huge problem with legal certainty as it would not be clear as to how the 
estate of the deceased would devolve. 
IV. Conclusion 
This paper has highlighted some of the problems with the Moosa v Harnaker judgment with 
regard to s 2(C)(1) of the Wills Act. The research has shown that the consequences of renuncia-
tion by a descendant of a deceased testator in terms of South African law are not the same as 
those in terms of Islamic law. It has also shown that the application of s 2(C)(1) of the Wills Act 
could be quite problematic in the instance where a testator or testatrix states in his last will and 
testament that Islamic law should find application to the distribution of his estate and that an 
Islamic Distribution Certificate issued by an Islamic law expert would be binding in this re-
gard. The precedent set by the Moosa v Harnaker judgment would lead one to believe that the 
Master of the High Court would most likely not accept a request to amend an Islamic Distribu-
tion Certificate in the event where a descendant who is named in such a certificate renounces 
the benefit subsequent to the lodging of the certificate at the Master of the High Court. My 
recommendation in this regard would be that executors of Islamic wills should discuss issues 
regarding renunciation and related matters with the Islamic law experts or institutions like the 
Muslim Judicial Council (SA) prior to lodging it with the Master of the High Court. This would 
 
30  See AL SUBAA’EE, supra n. 29, at 177-178; and AL ZUḤAYLEE, supra n. 29, at 440-442. 
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ensure that Islamic law consequences would find application in this regard, and it would en-
sure that the testator’s right to freedom of testation is given effect. 
